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investigate whether such announcements increased the quality of these firms’ earnings as
perceived by market participants.  Answering this research question not only provides evidence
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The Earnings Quality Consequences of Announcements to Voluntarily Adopt the  
Fair Value Method of Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation 
 
Tentative and Preliminary 
Please do not quote without permission 
 
I. Introduction 
 We identify 133 firms (hereinafter referred to as “recognizing firms”) that between July 
and December, 2002, announced plans to voluntarily adopt the fair value method of accounting 
for stock-based compensation.1  The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of such 
announcements on the recognizing firms’ earnings quality.  Specifically, we investigate whether 
announcements to adopt the fair value method increased the recognizing firms’ earnings quality 
as perceived by market participants.  We also investigate whether firms that had previously used 
the fair value method to value executive stock option grants disclosed in proxy statements 
experienced a greater increase in perceived earnings quality relative to firms that had not used 
the fair value method for proxy statement disclosure purposes.  
 Accounting for employee stock options (ESOs) has sparked considerable debate in recent 
years.  APB 25 (APB, 1973) generally requires firms to record ESO expense only if the market 
value of the stock on the grant date exceeds the exercise price.   Because ESOs typically have an 
exercise price at least equal to the stock price on the date of grant, and thus no intrinsic value, 
firms typically report little or no APB 25 ESO expense.  In 1993, the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) issued an exposure draft (FASB, 1993), which required firms to value 
ESOs at the grant date using a fair value method (e.g., Black-Scholes) and recognize ESO 
                                                 
1 Our search resulted in a potential sample of 150 firms, but we eliminate from our study nine foreign firms, five 
firms with missing data, and three firms that switched yearends.  Aboody, Barth, and Kasznik (2004a) identify 155 
firms that announced plans to recognize ESO expense in 2002 and early 2003.  134 (21) of their sample firms made 
their announcements in 2002 (2003).  We focus only on the 2002 announcers because we investigate the earnings 
quality of post-announcement earnings.     
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expense over the options’ vesting periods.  In 1995, the FASB succumbed to considerable 
political pressure and in its final standard, SFAS 123, backed away from requiring firms to 
recognize ESO expense using the fair value method (FASB, 1995).  Instead, SFAS 123 makes 
recognition of ESO expense using the fair value method optional and requires non-recognizing 
firms to disclose in the financial statement footnotes earnings per share amounts calculated as if 
the fair value method had been used.2   
 In 2002, the debate over ESO accounting resumed following a number of highly-
publicized accounting scandals that were blamed, at least in part, on the incentives created by 
executive stock options (e.g., Becker, 2002).  From July through December of 2002, the 133 
recognizing firms announced that they would begin recognizing ESO expense according to the 
fair value method outlined in SFAS 123.   Aboody, Barth and Kasznik (2004a) (hereinafter 
ABK) identify 155 firms that made such announcements in 2002 and early 2003 and found that 
the recognizing firms experienced positive abnormal returns around the announcement dates and 
argue that the voluntary adoption of SFAS 123 signals higher earnings quality.  The positive 
stock price effects documented in ABK (2004a), however, are not a function of the recognizing 
firms’ earnings.  In this study, we investigate whether the recognizing firms’ signals – the 
voluntary adoption of the fair value method of accounting for ESOs – enhanced their perceived 
earnings quality.  We link the recognizing firms’ positive stock price effects to their reported 
earnings and thus triangulate the findings in ABK (2004a). 
 We use the value relevance of earnings as a surrogate for earnings quality (e.g., Schipper 
and Vincent, 2003) and test whether the recognizing firms’ value relevance of earnings, 
                                                 
2 Aboody, Barth and Kasznik (2004a) report that only five publicly-traded firms chose to recognize ESO expense in 
the income statement prior to 2002.  Accordingly, 133 firms announcing plans to do so represents a substantial 
increase in the number of firms recognizing ESO expense and suggests a fundamental change in the financial 
reporting environment. 
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measured using both the price-earnings multiple and earnings response coefficient, are greater in 
the post-announcement period relative to the pre-announcement period.  Importantly, we do not 
test whether the ESO expense recognition pursuant to SFAS 123 improves earnings quality.  
Rather, we test whether the announcements to recognize SFAS 123 ESO expense increased the 
recognizing firms’ perceived earnings quality.   Moreover, even though the evidence in ABK 
(2004a) suggests that the recognizing firms are fundamentally than the non-recognizing firms, 
our research design focuses on the recognizing firms’ increases in perceived earnings quality and 
thus helps avoid selection bias issues.  
 Following Bagnoli and Watts (2004), we hypothesize that the impact of the 
announcements to voluntarily recognize SFAS 123 ESO expense on the recognizing firms’ value 
relevance of earnings is increasing in the informativeness of the fair value method of accounting 
for ESOs.  We assume that the fair value method is more (less) informative for firms that had 
(had not) previously valued executive stock option grants in their proxy statements using the fair 
value method.  We argue that firms previously using the fair value method for proxy statement 
reporting purposes are able to send a more credible signal of earnings quality to market 
participants than those firms that had been not been using a fair value method for this purpose. 
 Our results are consistent with an increase in the recognizing firms’ perceived earnings 
quality subsequent to their announcements to adopt the SFAS 123 recognition provisions.  We 
find that the recognizing firms’ price-earnings multiple and earnings response coefficient, 
relative to a control set of firms that did not announce plans to recognize ESO expense in 2002, 
increased significantly from the pre-announcement period to the post-announcement period.  We 
do not find, however, an incremental increase in the value relevance of earnings associated with 
the prior use of the fair value method to value ESO grants disclosed in the recognizing firms’ 
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proxy statements.  Overall, our results are consistent with the recognizing firms’ announcements 
to voluntarily recognize ESO expense sending a credible signal of higher earnings quality to 
market participants.  
 Our study makes several contributions.  First, we add to the stream of research that 
addresses voluntary accounting choices (see Fields, Lys and Vincent, 2001 for a review of this 
literature).  Using value relevance as the surrogate for earnings quality (e.g., Ghosh and Moon, 
2005), we investigate whether the recognizing firms’ voluntary adoption of the fair value method 
of accounting for ESOs led to higher perceived quality of earnings.  Second, our research also 
contributes to research that addresses disclosure versus recognition (e.g., Bernard and Schipper, 
1994; Aboody, 1997; Barth, Clinch and Shibano, 2003; ABK, 2004b) because SFAS 123 
requires disclosure of ESO expense and pro forma earnings per share when firms choose not to 
recognize ESO expense in the income statement.  Third, we add to the literature that addresses 
the effects of conservative accounting choices (e.g., Ahmed et al., 2002).  In contrast to prior 
studies that examine accruals which reverse over time, the choice to recognize ESO expense 
results in the persistent understatement of net income and thus provides a more powerful test of 
the consequences of conservative accounting choices.  Finally, our study contributes to the 
stream of research addressing accounting for ESOs (e.g., Dechow, Hutton and Sloan, 1996; 
Espahbodi et al., 2002; ABK, 2004a; ABK, 2004b), a topic that is once again at the forefront of 
the FASB’s agenda and the subject of considerable debate.  We find that the announcements to 
voluntarily recognize ESO expense are not only value relevant but that earnings quality is 
enhanced.  ABK (2004a) does not provide direct evidence that these announcements resulted in 
higher earnings quality. 
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  The paper proceeds as follows.  The next section develops the hypotheses investigated in 
this study.  The third section presents the models and data utilized to test the hypotheses.  Section 
four provides the sample selection process, including the selection of a control group of firms 
that did not voluntarily announce plans to recognize SFAS 123 expense in 2002.  Section five 
presents the results, and we conclude in section six.    
 
II. Hypothesis Development 
 A key issue in the ongoing ESO accounting debate is whether mandating ESO expense 
recognition would improve earnings quality.  Investigating whether announcements to 
voluntarily recognize ESO expense have increased the recognizing firms’ perceived earnings 
quality will inform this debate.  Evidence that market participants believe that such 
announcements enhance a firm’s earnings quality would suggest to policymakers (e.g., the 
FASB, SEC, Congress) that they believe ESO expense recognition should be mandated for all 
firms. 
 The current ESO debate began in 2002 after several highly-publicized accounting 
scandals severely impacted investor confidence and reignited calls for corporate financial 
reporting reform.  Placing a renewed emphasis on the importance of earnings quality, 
shareholders, other members of the investment community, and regulators began to demand 
increased transparency in corporate financial statements.  In particular, the recent series of 
corporate failures highlighted a need for reform and increased conservatism with regard to the 
accounting rules for ESOs.  For example, in an April, 2002 column written for the Washington 
Post, Berkshire Hathaway CEO, Warren Buffet states “Companies that expense options will 
develop a reputation for being believable, for not hyping things, and will be valued more than 
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those whose CEO is flim-flamming [investors]” (Buffet, A19).3  During a May, 2002 Financial 
Markets Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Federal Reserve Board Chairman, 
Alan Greenspan, reiterated the need for enhanced transparency in financial statements and 
implicated the non-recognition of stock-based compensation as a contributing factor to the 
overall decline in earnings quality (Greenspan, 2002).   
 The press also reported estimates of the extent to which corporate earnings are overstated 
as a result of ESO expense (generally) not being recognized.  For example, in a special report 
called “The Angry Market” published by Business Week, it was reported that U.S. companies 
had overstated earnings by approximately 15 percent due to the non-recognition of ESO expense 
and the underestimation of pension funding requirements (Henry, 2002).  As evidence that ESO 
expensing would have a greater effect on larger companies, this special report estimates that if all 
firms in the S&P 500 had expensed their ESOs, earnings per share would have declined by 24 
percent in 2001 and by 17 percent in 2002 (Vickers, 2002).   
 Both the FASB and International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) responded to 
investor concerns and re-opened the stock option accounting debate.  On February 19, 2004, the 
IASB issued International Financial Reporting Standard 2 Share-Based Payment, mandating the 
recognition of stock-based compensation expense using the fair value method (IASB, 2004).  On 
March 31, 2004, after reviewing comment letters from the public and undergoing lengthy 
deliberations, the FASB issued Share-Based Payment, a proposed statement regarding the 
accounting rules for stock-based compensation (FASB, 2004).  The proposed statement would 
eliminate the ability to account for ESO grants using the intrinsic value method under ABP 25, 
                                                 
3 Indeed, six of the seven companies for which Buffet is a director have since elected to voluntarily adopt the fair 
value method of accounting for ESOs (ABK, 2004a). 
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and would require firms to recognize stock-based compensation expense using the fair value 
method. 
 Consistent with the debate surrounding SFAS 123 a decade ago, the FASB’s and IASB’s 
actions have sparked heated debate.  For example, Morgenson and Glater (2003) report that in its 
comment letter to the FASB, TechNet, an organization headquartered in the Silicon Value 
consisting of over 200 executives from companies in technology industries (e.g., software, 
biotech, e-commerce), argues that stock options are “something of value to employees” but 
asserted that the divergent views among accountants regarding the treatment of stock options as a 
“corporate expense” serves as evidence that the FASB should maintain the status quo.  “We 
believe that requiring employee stock options to be treated as an expense would lead to 
misleading financial statements because no accurate, reliable and tested method of valuing stock 
options currently exists.”4  Similarly, Congress is also weighing in on the stock option 
accounting debate.  On July 20, 2004, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Stock 
Option Accounting Reform Act (H.R. 3574), which impacts accounting for ESOs in several 
ways, the most important of which limits mandatory expensing of ESOs to options granted to the 
top executive and four other most highly paid executives.5  
 Two theoretical studies provide insights that a conservative accounting choice such as 
expensing ESOs serves as a signal of higher earnings quality.  Hughes and Levine (2003) 
develop a signaling model in which there is an adverse selection problem between firms and 
their creditors.  High quality firms are able to choose a conservative accounting method and still 
have earnings sufficient to avoid debt covenant violations and satisfy other accounting-based 
                                                 
4 For more information on Technet see Who are we? 2004 Membership List. [Online] Retrieved March 5, 2004 from 
http://www.technet.org/who2/memberListName/ 
5 H.R. 3574 also requires that, if a fair value method such as Black-Scholes is used to value ESOs, assumed 
volatility must be zero.  This restriction would affect ESO values. 
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contracts, whereas low quality firms are unable to mimic this strategy.  The choice to recognize 
ESO expense using the fair value method is a conservative accounting method because doing so 
unambiguously results in lower net income. 
 Similarly, Bagnoli and Watts (2004) develop a signaling model in which managers trade 
off the stock price benefits of reporting conservatively versus the costs of potentially missing 
earnings expectations.  They find a separating equilibrium in which “bad” firms report non-
conservatively and “good” firms report conservatively.  The intuition behind their result is that if 
the “bad” firm reports conservatively, mimicking “good” firms, the benefit of a higher stock 
price is outweighed by the costs of missing the firm’s earnings expectation.  In contrast, if the 
“good” firm reports non-conservatively, mimicking the “bad” firm, the benefit of beating the 
firm’s earnings expectation is outweighed by the cost of a lower stock price. 
 Whereas Hughes and Levine (2003) and Bagnoli and Watts (2004) both provide 
theoretical support for the argument that a conservative accounting choice signals higher quality 
to financial statement users, the latter study also provides insights into the relation between 
earnings conservatism and stock prices.  Generally, Bagnoli and Watts show that a firm’s 
earnings response coefficient, a surrogate for earnings quality (Schipper and Vincent, 2003), is 
higher when it makes the conservative accounting choice. 
 Consistent with the signaling benefits of a conservative accounting choice, ABK (2004a) 
provide evidence that the 155 firms in their sample that announced plans to voluntarily recognize 
ESO expense did so to signal higher earnings quality and thus increase stock price.  They find 
that firms more active in the capital market, firms with greater information asymmetry 
concerning the firms’ prospects, firms with top managers having a greater incentive to increase 
stock prices, and larger firms with greater political costs were more likely to voluntarily adopt 
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the SFAS 123 recognition provisions.  Surprisingly, after controlling for other determinants, 
ABK (2004a) find that even though the magnitude of the effect of expensing ESOs on the 
recognizing firms’ earnings was immaterial, it played an insignificant role in firms’ decisions to 
announce plans to recognize ESO expense.     
  ABK (2004a) also indirectly test whether firms’ announcements to voluntarily recognize 
ESO expense signaled higher earnings quality to market participants.  ABK (2004a) argue that 
even though ESO expense is already disclosed in the footnotes, these announcements provide a 
credible signal of earnings quality that lowers information asymmetry between the firm and 
market participants.  This reduced information asymmetry reduces the firm’s risk premium, 
which, in turn, increases the firm’s stock price (e.g., Bartov and Bodnar, 1996).  Consistent with 
this argument, ABK (2004a) find that the recognizing firms experienced abnormal positive stock 
returns around the announcement dates.  The positive stock market reactions to the recognizing 
firms’ announcements, however, are not a function of earnings.  Accordingly, to more directly 
investigate the earnings quality effects of these announcements, we test the following hypothesis 
(stated in the alternative):  
H1: Recognizing firms have higher perceived earnings quality after the announcements 
of plans to voluntarily adopt the fair value method of accounting for ESOs than before 
the announcements. 
 
 At the heart of the ESO accounting debate is whether current valuation methods can be 
applied to ESOs (Morgenson and Glater, 2003).  Since 1992, all publicly traded firms have had 
an opportunity to choose the fair value method to value ESO grants disclosed in their proxy 
statement filings.  The 1992 proxy statement disclosure rules promulgated by the SEC give 
management limited discretion in reporting the value of stock options granted to top executives 
in the annual proxy statements.  Firms can choose to report either the potential value of options 
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granted assuming stock prices appreciate at 5 percent or 10 percent annually during the term of 
the option (“potential realizable value method”), or the present value of options on the date of 
grant estimated using the Black-Scholes model, a binomial model, or other accepted option 
pricing model.  Accordingly, firms have historically made the choice of whether fair value 
methods are sufficiently reliable for their proxy statement ESO disclosures; i.e., firms that used 
the present value method presumably believe that method is more reliable and thus more 
informative than the potential realizable value method, and vice versa.  We thus assume that the 
fair value method is more informative for the recognizing firms that had previously valued 
executive stock option grants in their proxy statements using the fair value method than for the 
recognizing firms that had used the potential realizable value method.  We argue that firms 
previously using the fair value method for proxy statement reporting purposes are thus able to 
send a more credible signal of earnings quality to market participants.  Accordingly, this 
discussion leads to our second hypothesis (stated in the alternative):   
H2: Recognizing firms that use the present value method in their proxy statements will 
have a greater increase in perceived earnings quality than the recognizing firms that use 
the potential realizable value method in their proxy statements. 
 
  
III. Research Design 
In our investigation of the perceived earnings quality consequences of announcements to 
voluntarily adopt the fair value method of accounting for ESOs, we use two value relevance 
measures, the price-earnings multiple and the earnings response coefficient, as surrogates for 
earnings quality (Schipper and Vincent, 2003).  We first model the price-earnings relation as 
follows: 
MVEit = α0 + α1Eit + εit        (1) 
where 
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MVEit =  market value of common equity three months after fiscal year end (monthly 
Compustat data item MKVALM) scaled by common shares outstanding (annual 
Compustat data item CSHO) as of the beginning of the fiscal year; 
Eit  =  income before extraordinary items, discontinued operations, and changes in 
accounting principles (annual Compustat data item IB) scaled by the common 
shares outstanding (annual Compustat item CSHO) as of the beginning of the 
fiscal year; and 
εit  =  random disturbance term. 
 We do not adjust the recognizing firms’ post-announcement period earnings for 
recognized SFAS 123 ESO expense because we use income before changes in accounting 
principles as our earnings measure.  Next, we revise equation (1) to separately estimate the price-
earnings multiple both prior and subsequent to the recognizing firms’ announcements to 
voluntarily adopt the recognition provisions of SFAS 123: 
MVEit = α0 + α1Eit + α2DPi + α3Eit*DPi + εit     (2) 
where 
DPi =  an indicator variable equal to 1 for the first fiscal year ending after the 
announcement to adopt the fair value method was made; DPi  equals 0 for the last 
fiscal year ending before the announcement; and 
all other variables are as previously defined. 
Based on H1, we expect the increase in the price-earnings multiple from the pre-
announcement period to the post-announcement period, α3, to be positive.  To control for the 
possibility that α3 simply captures a differential price-earnings multiple between years, however, 
and not the effect of announcements to voluntarily adopt the fair value method of accounting for 
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ESOs, we identify a control set of firms that did not make such announcements and revise 
equation (2) as follows: 
MVEit = α0 + α1Eit + α2DPi + α3Eit*DPi + α4DSi + α5Eit*DSi + α6DPi*DSi 
    + α7Eit*DPi*DSi + εit       (3) 
where 
DSi =  an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm announced the adoption of the fair 
value method in 2002; DSi equals 0 otherwise; and 
all other variables are as previously defined.  For the control firms, we set DPi = 1 for the 
first fiscal year ending after June, 2002 and DPi = 0 for the last fiscal year ending before July, 
2002.6 
 A positive coefficient on Eit*DPi*DSi, α7, would be consistent with H1, and would be 
helpful in ruling out other events (e.g., the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation) as an explanation for the 
recognizing firms’ increase in the price-earnings multiple. 
 Alternatively, we regress annual stock returns on earnings and the change in earnings to 
test H1 using the earnings response coefficient as a measure of earnings quality.  Following 
Easton and Harris (1991), we begin by estimating the following model: 
 Rit = β0 + β1Eit + β2∆Eit + µit        (4) 
where 
Rit  =  the market adjusted return using the equal-weighted market index for the 
twelve month period ending three months after fiscal year end; 
Eit  =  income before extraordinary items, discontinued operations, and changes in 
accounting principles (annual Compustat data item IB) scaled by market value of 
                                                 
6 In sensitivity tests in which we exclude control firms with July through November yearends, the inferences based 
on the results reported in Tables 3 and 4 do not change. 
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equity at the end of the third month after year t-1 fiscal year end (monthly 
Compustat data item MKVALM); 
∆Eit  =  the change in income before extraordinary items, discontinued operations, and 
changes in accounting principles from year t-1 (annual Compustat data item IB) 
scaled by market value of equity at the end of the third month after year t-2 fiscal 
year end (monthly Compustat data item MKVALM); and 
µit =  random disturbance term. 
Next, consistent with equation (2), we revise equation (4) to separately estimate the 
earnings response coefficient both prior and subsequent to the recognizing firms’ announcements 
to voluntarily adopt the recognition provisions of SFAS 123: 
 Rit = β0 + β1Eit + β2∆Eit + β3DPi + β4Eit*DPi + β5∆Eit*DPi + µit   (5) 
where all variables are as previously defined.  Positive coefficients on Eit*DPi and ∆Eit*DPi, β4 
and β5, respectively, would be consistent with H1; i.e., the recognizing firms experience an 
increase in perceived earnings quality after the announcement to voluntarily adopt the fair value 
method of accounting for ESOs. 
 Consistent with equation (3), we also estimate the following model to compare the 
recognizing firms to the control set of firms that did not announce the intent to voluntarily adopt 
the SFAS 123 recognition provisions in 2002: 
Rit = β0 + β1Eit + β2∆Eit + β3DPi + β4Eit*DPi + β5∆Eit*DPi + β6DSi  
 + β7Eit*DSi + β8∆Eit*DSi + β9DPi*DSi + β10Eit*DPi*DSi 
 + β11∆Eit*DPi*DSi  + µit       (6) 
where all variables are as previously defined.  We test whether β10 > 0 and whether β11 > 0; i.e., 
whether the recognizing firms’ increases in earnings response coefficients are greater than the 
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corresponding increases for the control firms.  These results would be consistent with our first 
hypothesis (H1) that the recognizing firms experienced an increase in perceived earnings quality 
after the announcement to voluntarily recognize ESO expense according to SFAS 123. 
To test our second hypothesis that recognizing firms using the present value method to 
value ESOs in their proxy statements experience a greater increase in perceived earnings quality 
than those firms using the potential realizable value method for this purpose, we modify 
equations (2) and (5) as follows: 
MVEit = α0 + α1Eit + α2DPi + α3Eit*DPi + α4FVi + α5Eit*FVi + α6DPi*FVi  
    + α7Eit*DPi*FVi + εit       (7) 
Rit = β0 + β1Eit + β2∆Eit + β3DPi + β4Eit*DPi + β5∆Eit*DPi + β6FVi + β7Eit*FVi 
 + β8∆Eit*FVi + β9DPi*FVi + β10Eit*DPi*FVi + β11∆Eit*DPi*FVi + µit (8) 
where 
FVi =  an indicator variable equal to 1 if the company uses a fair value option pricing 
model to value ESO grants disclosed in its proxy statement (Black Scholes or 
binomial method); FVi equals 0 if the company uses an alternate option pricing 
model in its proxy statement; and 
all other variables are as previously defined. 
 We test whether α7 > 0 in equation (7) and in equation (8) we test whether β10 > 0 and 
whether β11 > 0.  These tests provide evidence regarding whether the recognizing firms that 
previously used the fair value method for proxy statement disclosure purposes experienced 
greater increases in their price-earnings multiples and earnings response coefficients than firms 
that had not used the fair value method for proxy statement purposes. 
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IV. Sample Selection   
 The purpose of this study is to examine the perceived earnings quality implications of the 
recognizing firms’ announcements to voluntarily adopt the fair value method of accounting for 
stock-based compensation during the period between July and December 2002.  A search of 
corporate press releases and business news articles on the Dow Jones News Services Database 
(now Factiva) results in a potential sample of 150 recognizing firms.  As depicted in Figure 1, 
the majority of recognizing firms made announcements to voluntarily recognize stock-based 
compensation expense in July and August of 2002.  Specifically, 30 firms made announcements 
in July, and 64 firms made announcements in August.  The remaining 56 announcement dates 
occurred fairly evenly in the remaining period September through December 2002.   
 Because the focus of this study is on financial reporting issues under U.S. GAAP, nine 
foreign firms (18 firm-years) were excluded to avoid inconsistencies in financial reporting.  An 
additional five firms (10 firm-years) were eliminated due to data unavailability resulting from the 
occurrence of mergers, restatements, or bankruptcy filings during the pre- and post-
announcement periods.  Finally, we exclude three firms that changed yearends during the pre- or 
post-announcement periods.  Including these firms would have resulted in using inconsistent 
earnings measures during our test period.  
 The resulting sample of 133 recognizing firms (266 firm-years) consists of 44 firms that 
implemented the fair value method beginning in fiscal 2002, 83 firms that planned to implement 
the fair value method starting in fiscal 2003, and six firms that postponed implementation until 
fiscal 2004.7  Because we test the hypothesis that the recognizing firms’ announcements to adopt 
the SFAS 123 recognition provisions, not the actual recognition of ESO expense in the income 
                                                 
7 When we compare just the 2002 implementers to the control firms in the estimations of equations (3) and (6), our 
results fail to support both H1 and H2.  This result could be due to low number of recognizing firm-years in our test 
samples. 
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statement, signals higher earnings quality, we use income before changes in accounting 
principles as our earnings measure to ensure that recognized SFAS 123 ESO expense is excluded 
in the post-announcement period firm-years.  Doing so makes post-announcement earnings for 
the 2002 implementers comparable to earnings for all other firm-years.  
 Our test samples are determined as follows.  For purposes of the tests using the price-
earnings multiple as a surrogate for earnings quality, 7 firm-years with missing data and 39 firm-
years with losses were excluded, reducing the recognizing firm sub-sample from 266 to 220 
firm-years.8  This subsample is further reduced to 205 firm-years when observations that result in 
a studentized residual greater than two in the estimation of equation (3) are deleted.  When the 
earnings response coefficient is used as a proxy for earnings quality, 17 firm-years with missing 
data are eliminated, resulting in a recognizing firm sub-sample of 249 firm-years.  Four firm-
years that result in a studentized residual greater than two in the estimation of equation (6) are 
deleted, resulting in a sub-sample of 245 firm-years.9   
 Following ABK (2004a), we identify a control group consisting of all firms from the 
S&P 500, S&P 400 mid-capitalization, and S&P 600 small-capitalization indices that did not 
announce plans to voluntarily adopt the SFAS 123 recognition provisions during 2002 and have 
data available on Compustat necessary to perform our tests.10  After deleting influential 
observations based on studentized residuals greater than two in the estimation of equations (3) 
and (6), respectively, this selection process results in control samples of 2,131 firm-years for our 
                                                 
8 Firm years in which net losses are reported are eliminated from the sample because prior research (eg. Collins, 
Pincus, and Xie, 1999) shows that the relation between stock price and earnings is different for profitable versus loss 
firms, and that the stock price of the latter firms is driven by the book value of equity.   
9 Consistent with ABK (2004a), a substantial percentage of the recognizing firms are from the financial institutions 
industry (SIC one-digit code = 6).  Specifically, 109 firm-years (53 percent) and 120 firm-years (49 percent) in the 
price-earnings multiple and earnings response coefficient test samples, respectively, are from this industry.  When 
we re-estimate equations (3) and (6) excluding these firms, our results fail to support either H1 or H2. 
10 ABK (2004a) also restrict their control group to firms that disclosed SFAS 123 in the footnotes and to industries 
matching at least one firm in the recognizing sample.  We do not impose these restrictions.. 
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price-earnings multiple tests in which loss-year observations are excluded, and 2,582 firm-years 
for our earnings response coefficient tests in which loss-year observations are retained.11  This 
sample selection process is summarized in Table 1.  All variables are winsorized at the extreme 
1st and 99th percentiles. 
V. Results 
 Table 2 reports descriptive statistics separately for the recognizing firm sub-sample 
(DSi=1) and the non-recognizing firm control group (DSi=0).  The recognizing firm sub-sample 
means and medians for both earnings (Eit) and market value of equity (MVEit) are significantly 
greater than the corresponding means and medians for the control group of firms.  These results 
suggest that the recognizing firms, which are more profitable and larger than the control firms, 
have more ability to take the hit to earnings resulting from expensing ESOs.  Interestingly, the 
debt to equity ratio, a proxy for debt covenant constraints, mean and median are significantly 
greater for the recognizing firm sub-sample than the corresponding mean and median for the 
control group of firms.  There is no statistical difference in stock returns (Rit) or change in 
earnings (∆Eit) between the two groups. 
 Table 3 reports the results of testing H1 using the price-earnings multiple as a proxy for 
earnings quality.  The first column in Table 3 reports the results of regressing the market value of 
equity on earnings, equation (1), for the recognizing firm sub-sample, resulting in a price-
earnings multiple of 8.8129 (two-tailed p<0.001).  The second column of Table 3 reports the 
results of estimating equation (2) for the recognizing firm sub-sample.  Consistent with H1, the 
coefficient on Eit*DPi is positive (coefficient estimate = 0.8049) and statistically significant 
(two-tailed p=0.089).  This result suggests that firms’ announcements to adopt the fair value 
                                                 
11 Our results are sensitive to the exclusion of influential observations.  When we include these influential 
observations in our test samples, our results generally fail to support either H1 or H2. 
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method of accounting for stock-based compensation are associated with an increased price-
earnings multiple in the post-announcement period, consistent with the hypothesis that 
announcements to recognize ESO expense signal higher earnings quality.  The final column of 
Table 3 reports the results of estimating equation (3) for the full sample, which includes the 
control set of firm-years that did not announce plans in 2002 to recognize ESO expense using the 
fair value method.  The coefficient on Eit*DPi*DSi is significantly greater than zero (coefficient 
estimate = 1.0908; two-tailed p=0.065), consistent with an increased price-earnings multiple for 
the recognizing firms relative to the control firms.  This result helps rule out the alternative 
explanation that the increased price-earnings multiple for the recognizing firms is due to other 
events occurring during this time period. 
 Table 4 reports the results of testing H1 using the earnings response coefficient as the 
surrogate for earnings quality.  The first column reports the results of estimating equation (4) for 
the recognizing firm sub-sample.  The coefficient on earnings (Eit) is significantly positive (two-
tailed p<0.001), but the coefficient on the change in earnings (∆Eit) is insignificant (two-tailed 
p=0.212).  The second column of Table 4 reports the results of estimating equation (5) for the 
recognizing firm sub-sample.  These results reflect a significantly positive incremental 
coefficient on Eit*DPi (coefficient estimate = 0.6233; two-tailed p=0.003) but not ∆Eit*DPi (two-
tailed p=0.234).  This latter result is not surprising given that the coefficient on ∆Eit is 
insignificant in the across-year (column one) estimation. The last column of Table 4 reflects the 
results of estimating equation (6).  In this estimation, the coefficient on Eit*DPi*DSi is 
insignificant (two-tailed p=0.651), but the positive coefficient on ∆Eit*DPi*DSi, 0.2747, is 
significantly different from zero (two-tailed p=0.065).  The results indicate that after controlling 
for the pre- and post- announcement period effects, the recognizing firms (DS=1) have an 
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incremental increase in value relevance of earnings changes but not earnings levels relative to the 
control firms (DS=0).  Overall, the earnings response coefficient test results reported in Table 4 
are consistent with the hypothesis that the recognizing firms had an increase in perceived 
earnings quality after the announcements to recognize ESO expense using the fair value method.  
Taken together, both the price-earnings multiple and earnings response coefficient test results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that the recognizing firms’ announcements to adopt the SFAS 123 
recognition provisions increased their perceived earnings quality. 
 We now turn our discussion to the test of our hypothesis (H2) that recognizing firms that 
previously used the fair value method in their proxy statement ESO disclosures have a greater 
increase in earnings quality than the recognizing firms that use the potential realizable value 
method in their proxy statements.  In the sample of recognizing firms, 61, or 46%, used a fair 
value method in their proxy statement ESO disclosures.  The results of estimating equation (7) 
are reported in Table 5, Panel A.  Inconsistent with H2, when using the price-earnings multiple 
as a proxy for earnings quality, the coefficient on Eit*DPi*FVi is insignificant (two-tailed 
p=0.770).  Likewise, as reported in Panel B of Table 5, when using the earnings response 
coefficient as the earnings quality surrogate, neither the coefficient on Eit*DPi*FVi nor 
∆Eit*DPi*FVi in the estimation of equation (8) is significantly differently from zero.  Overall, the 
estimation results reported in Table 5 do not support H2; i.e., we provide no evidence consistent 
with the hypothesis that the recognizing firms that previously used the fair value method for 
proxy statement disclosure purposes had a greater increase in perceived earnings quality than 
those recognizing firms not using the fair value method for such purposes. 
 We next perform a sensitivity test based on the ABK (2004a) finding that only those 
firms that announced plans to voluntarily recognize ESO expense early (July, 2002 announcers) 
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experienced significantly positive announcement period returns.  To provide evidence on 
whether early announcers experience greater increases in earnings quality than late announcers, 
we modify equations (2) and (5) as follows: 
MVEit = α0 + α1Eit + α2DPi + α3Eit*DPi + α4EARLYi + α5Eit*EARLYi  
 + α6DPit*EARLYi + α7Eit*DPi*EARLYi + εit    (9) 
Rit = β0 + β1Eit + β2∆Eit + β3DPi + β4Eit*DPi + β5∆Eit*DPi + β6*EARLYi 
 + β7Eit*EARLYi + β8∆Eit*EARLYi + β9DPi*EARLYi + β10Eit*DPi*EARLYi  
 + β11∆Eit*DPi*EARLYi + µit       (10) 
where 
EARLYi  =  an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm announced the switch to recognize 
ESO expense in July of 2002; EARLYi equals 0 if the firm announced the 
switch after July 31, 2002 and on or before December 31, 2002; and 
all other variables are as previously defined. 
 The results of estimating equation (9) are reported in Table 6, Panel A.  The coefficient 
on Eit*DPi*EARLYi is not significantly different from zero (two-tailed p=0.999).  Panel B of 
Table 6 reports the results of estimating equation (10).  Also inconsistent with the early 
announcers having a greater increase in earning quality than subsequent announcers, the 
coefficients on Eit*DPi*EARLYi and Et*DPi*EARLYi are not significantly different from zero 
(two-tailed p=0.127 and 0.642, respectively).  Overall, the results reported in Table 6 provide no 
evidence that the early announcers experienced a greater increase in perceived earnings quality 





 Based on a sample of 133 firms that announced plans to voluntarily adopt the fair value 
method of accounting for stock-based compensation between July and December 2002, this 
study provides evidence that these recognizing firms experienced a significantly greater price-
earnings multiple and earnings response coefficient in the post-announcement date period.  This 
study provides no evidence, however, that the recognizing firms using the fair value method in 
their proxy statements experienced significantly greater increases in perceived earnings quality 
in the post-announcement period than the firms using the potential realizable value method. 
 Our results provide evidence consistent with the recognizing firms’ announcements to 
voluntarily recognize SFAS 123 ESO expense, an accounting choice that is conservative because 
it results in the persistent understatement of net income relative to footnote disclosure, sending a 
credible signal of earnings quality to market participants.  This evidence thus contributes to the 
voluntary accounting choice (e.g., Fields, Lys and Vincent, 2001) and conservatism (e.g., Ahmed 
et al., 2002) streams of literature.  Also, because the signal of earnings quality sent to market 
participants involves recognizing an expense already disclosed in the footnotes, our evidence 
adds to the literature addressing recognition versus disclosure (e.g., Bernard and Schipper, 1994; 
Aboody 1997; Barth, Clinch and Shibano, 2003; ABK, 2004b).  Finally, because our evidence 
suggests that market participants perceive that firms expensing ESOs have higher earnings 
quality, this evidence implies that investors prefer expensing of ESOs to footnote disclosure.  We 
thus contribute to the ongoing debate concerning accounting for stock-based compensation (e.g., 
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Total firms 150 1,411 150 1,411 
Less:  Foreign firms (9) ---- (9) ---- 
Less:  Firms with no data available (5) ---- (5) ---- 
Less: Firms with change in year end (3) (9) (3) (9) 
Firms in sample 133 1,402 133 1,402 
     










Less:  Firm-years with missing data (7) (32) (17) (89) 
Less:  Firm-years with losses (39) (516) ---- --- 
Less:  Influential observations3 (15) (125) (4) (133) 
Final sample 205 2,131 245 2,582 
 
1 Recognizing firms are those firms that announced plans to voluntarily adopt the fair value method 
of accounting for stock-based compensation during the period between July and December, 2002 
2 Control firms consist of all firms from the S&P 500, S&P 400 mid-capitalization, and S&P 600 
small-capitalization indices that did not announce plans to voluntarily adopt the SFAS 123 
recognition provisions during 2002. 
3 Influential observations are defined as those observations with a studentized residual greater than 
two in the estimation of equation (3) for the price-earnings multiple tests and equation (6) for the 






         

















DS=1 –Recognizing firms  
E 205 2.1599* 1.2942 0.0541 1.3572 1.9417* 2.7812 6.2697 
MVE 205 35.0246* 15.8046 5.0475 25.4135 33.7112* 42.0179 85.9653 
R 245 -0.0360 0.2631 -0.7265 -0.2208 -0.0586 0.1185 0.6460 
∆E 245 0.0013 0.0864 -0.2807 -0.0237 0.0037 0.0268 0.4397 
Debt/Equity 245 3.4789* 29.2059 -4.1484 0.4090 0.9272* 1.6234 455.3902 
DSBCE 238 77.0979 179.5528 0.0000 1.0000 7.5930 53.0000 1,514.0000 
RSBCE 37 14.5857 60.0992 0.0120 0.0910 0.4050 3.3000 365.0000 
         
DS=0 – Control firms  
E 2,131 1.4347* 1.0393 0.0541 0.7347 1.2340* 1.8692 6.2697 
MVE 2,131 26.3043* 12.4899 5.0475 17.3505 24.6523* 33.5535 85.9653 
R 2,582 -0.0742 0.2797 -0.7265 -0.2580 -0.0828 0.1139 0.7793 
∆E 2,582 0.0026 0.0808 -0.2807 -0.0221 0.0048 0.0244 0.4397 
Debt/Equity 2,576 0.6784* 2.9898 -70.8180 0.0635 0.4354* 0.9382 59.4192 
 
Notes to Table 2 
DS is an indicator variable =1 if the firm is a recognizing firm and =0 if the firm is a control firm.  
E is income before extraordinary items, discontinued operations, and changes in accounting principles (annual Compustat data item IB) scaled by the common 
shares outstanding (annual Compustat data item CSHO) as of the beginning of the fiscal year. 
MVE is the market value of equity three months after fiscal year end (monthly Compustat data item MKVALM) scaled by the common shares outstanding (annual 
Compustat data item CSHO) as of the beginning of the fiscal year. 
R  is the market adjusted cumulative return for the twelve month period ending three months after fiscal year end. 
∆E is the change in income before extraordinary items, discontinued operations, and changes in accounting principles from year t-1 (annual Compustat data item 
IB) scaled by market value of equity at the end of the third month after year t-2 fiscal year end (monthly Compustat data item MKVALM). 
Debt/Equity Total long term debt (Compustat data item DLTT) divided by common equity (Compustat data item CEQ) at the end of year t. 
DSBCE stock based compensation expense disclosed in the financial statements of the recognizing firms in millions of dollars. 
RSBCE stock based compensation expense recognized in the financial statements of post-announcement period implementers in millions of dollars. 
E, MVE, R, and ∆E are all winsorized at the extreme 1% and 99%.  Observations that have studentized residuals >2 in estimating equations (3) or (6) are deleted. 
* Mean or median is significantly different across the two groups at a two-tailed p <0.001. 
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Table 3 
Effect of Announcing the Adoption of the Fair Value Method of Accounting for Stock Options on the Price-earnings Multiple 
 
Dependent variable is the Scaled Market Value of Equity (MVE) 
 
 Coefficient Estimates (two-tailed p-values) 
 Recognizing firms only 
n=205 firm years 
 Recognizing and control firms 









































DS*DP      -3.1834 
(0.082) 




E*DP*DS      1.0908 
(0.065) 
       




Notes to Table 3 
 
MVE is the market value of equity three months after fiscal year end (monthly Compustat data item MKVALM). 
E is income before extraordinary items, discontinued operations, and changes in accounting principles (annual Compustat data item IB). 
DP is an indicator variable =1 for the first fiscal year ending after the announcement to recognize SFAS 123 expense (June 2002) and =0 for the last 
fiscal year ending before the announcement (July 2002) for the recognizing (control) firms.  
DS is an indicator variable =1 if the firm is a recognizing firm and =0 if the firm is a control firm.  
All variables, except the indicator variables, are scaled by the common shares outstanding (annual Compustat data item CSHO) as of the beginning 
of the fiscal year. 
 




Effect of Announcing the Adoption of the Fair Value Method of Accounting for Stock Options on the Earnings Response 
Coefficient 
 
Dependent Variable is Stock Returns (R) 
 
 Coefficient Estimates and (two-tailed p-values) 
 Recognizing firms only 
n=245 firm years 




























































DS*DP      0.0776 
(0.027) 








E*DP*DS      -0.1017 
(0.651) 
∆E*DP*DS      0.2747 
(0.065) 




Notes to Table 4 
 
R is the market adjusted cumulative return for the twelve month period ending three months after fiscal year end. 
E is income before extraordinary items, discontinued operations, and changes in accounting principles (annual Compustat data item IB) scaled by 
market value of equity at the end of the third month after year t-1 fiscal year end (monthly Compustat data item MKVALM). 
∆E is the change in income before extraordinary items, discontinued operations, and changes in accounting principles from year t-1 (annual 
Compustat data item IB) scaled by market value of equity at the end of the third month after year t-2 fiscal year end (monthly Compustat data item 
MKVALM). 
DP is an indicator variable =1 for the first fiscal year ending after the announcement to recognize SFAS 123 expense (June 2002) and =0 for the last 
fiscal year ending before the announcement (July 2002) for the recognizing (control) firms.  
DS is an indicator variable =1 if the firm is a recognizing firm and =0 if the firm is a control firm. 
 






Incremental Effect of Consistency in Stock Option Value Disclosures 
 
Panel A – Price-earnings Multiple – Dependent Variable is MVE 
 
 Coefficient Estimate Two-tailed p-value 
Intercept 19.7528 <0.001 
E 7.6003 <0.001 
DP -7.2706 0.002 
E*DP 0.8310 0.120 
FV 2.7947 0.437 
FV*DP -3.7395 0.407 
E*FV 1.4617 0.312 
E*DP*FV -0.4518 0.770 
   
Adjusted R2 0.586  
N 201  
 
 
Notes to Table 5 Panel A 
 
MVE is the market value of equity three months after fiscal year end (monthly Compustat data item MKVALM). 
E is income before extraordinary items, discontinued operations, and changes in accounting principles (annual 
Compustat data item IB). 
DP is an indicator variable =1 for the first fiscal year ending after the announcement to recognize SFAS 123 expense 
(June 2002) and =0 for the last fiscal year ending before the announcement (July 2002) for the recognizing (control) 
firms.  
FV is an indicator variable =1 if the company previously used a fair value option pricing model in its proxy 
statement (Black Scholes or binomial method). FV = 0 if the company used an alternate option pricing model in its 
proxy statement (Potential Realizable Value method). 
 
All variables, except the indicator variables, are scaled by the common shares outstanding (annual Compustat data 
item CSHO) as of the beginning of the fiscal year. 
 
E and MVE are winsorized at the extreme 1% and 99%.  Observations with studentized residuals >2 from estimating 
equation (3) are deleted. 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
 
Panel B – Earnings Response Coefficient – Dependent Variable is R 
 
 Coefficient Estimate Two-tailed p-value 
Intercept -0.0755 0.029 
E 0.6385 0.051 
∆E 0.5961 0.147 
DP 0.0297 0.487 
E*DP 0.7958 0.003 
∆E*DP -0.0451 0.848 
FV -0.1544 0.003 
FV*DP 0.1631 0.015 
E*FV 1.1527 0.057 
∆E*FV -0.8994 0.023 
E*DP*FV -1.0827 0.130 
∆E*DP*FV -0.1184 0.883 
   
Adjusted R2 0.307  
N 241  
 
 
Notes to Table 5 Panel B 
 
R is the market adjusted cumulative return for the twelve month period ending three months after fiscal year end. 
E is income before extraordinary items, discontinued operations, and changes in accounting principles (annual 
Compustat data item IB) scaled by market value of equity at the end of the third month after year t-1 fiscal year end 
(monthly Compustat data item MKVALM). 
∆E is the change in income before extraordinary items, discontinued operations, and changes in accounting 
principles from year t-1 (annual Compustat data item IB) scaled by market value of equity at the end of the third 
month after year t-2 fiscal year end (monthly Compustat data item MKVALM). 
DP is an indicator variable =1 for the first fiscal year ending after the announcement to recognize SFAS 123 expense 
(June 2002) and =0 for the last fiscal year ending before the announcement (July 2002) for the recognizing (control) 
firms.  
FV is an indicator variable =1 if the company previously used a fair value option pricing model in its proxy 
statement (Black Scholes or binomial method). FV = 0 if the company used an alternate option pricing model in its 
proxy statement (Potential Realizable Value method). 
 
R, E and ∆E are winsorized at the extreme 1% and 99%.  Observations with studentized residuals >2 from 





Incremental Effect of Early versus Late Announcers 
 
Panel A – Price-earnings Multiple – Dependent Variable is MVE 
 
 Coefficient Estimate Two-tailed p-value 
Intercept 20.4309 <0.001 
E 8.3667 <0.001 
DP -8.0579 0.001 
E*DP 0.6248 0.441 
EARLY 0.0250 0.993 
EARLY*DP -2.9084 0.525 
E*EARLY 0.4633 0.358 
E*DP*EARLY -0.0015 0.999 
   
Adjusted R2 0.570  
N 205  
 
 
Notes to Table 6 Panel A 
 
MVE is the market value of equity three months after fiscal year end (monthly Compustat data item MKVALM). 
E is income before extraordinary items, discontinued operations, and changes in accounting principles (annual 
Compustat data item IB). 
DP is an indicator variable =1 for the first fiscal year ending after the announcement to recognize SFAS 123 expense 
(June 2002) and =0 for the last fiscal year ending before the announcement (July 2002) for the recognizing (control) 
firms.  
EARLY is an indicator variable =1 if the company announced the switch in July of 2002. EARLY = 0 if the company 
announced the switch after July 31, 2002 and before December 31, 2002. 
 
All variables, except the indicator variables, are scaled by the common shares outstanding (annual Compustat data 
item CSHO) as of the beginning of the fiscal year. 
 
E and MVE are winsorized at the extreme 1% and 99%.  Observations with studentized residuals >2 from estimating 




Table 6 (Continued) 
 
Panel B – Earnings Response Coefficient – Dependent Variable is R 
 
 Coefficient Estimate Two-tailed p-value 
Intercept -0.1701 <0.001 
E 1.4124 <0.001 
∆E -0.3643 0.202 
DP 0.0866 0.012 
E*DP 0.5211 0.014 
∆E*DP 0.3132 0.065 
EARLY 0.0530 0.385 
EARLY*DP 0.2592 0.018 
E*EARLY -1.3259 0.034 
∆E*EARLY 1.2237 0.301 
E*DP*EARLY -1.8618 0.127 
∆E*DP*EARLY -0.6596 0.642 
   
Adjusted R2 0.324  
N 245  
 
 
Notes to Table 6 Panel B 
 
R is the market adjusted cumulative return for the twelve month period ending three months after fiscal year end. 
E is income before extraordinary items, discontinued operations, and changes in accounting principles (annual 
Compustat data item IB) scaled by market value of equity at the end of the third month after year t-1 fiscal year end 
(monthly Compustat data item MKVALM). 
∆E is the change in income before extraordinary items, discontinued operations, and changes in accounting 
principles from year t-1 (annual Compustat data item IB) scaled by market value of equity at the end of the third 
month after year t-2 fiscal year end (monthly Compustat data item MKVALM). 
DP is an indicator variable =1 for the first fiscal year ending after the announcement to recognize SFAS 123 expense 
(June 2002) and =0 for the last fiscal year ending before the announcement (July 2002) for the recognizing (control) 
firms.  
EARLY is an indicator variable =1 if the company announced the switch in July of 2002. EARLY = 0 if the company 
announced the switch after July 31, 2002 and before December 31, 2002. 
 
R, E and ∆E are winsorized at the extreme 1% and 99%.  Observations with studentized residuals > 2 from 
estimating equation (6) are deleted. 
 
 
